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Decommissioning the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant and Storing Its Radioactive Waste.

Fairewinds Associates, Inc first notified the Vermont State Legislature of its concerns regarding
the decommissioning fund for the Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant.

Fairewinds Associates Decommissioning Overview

A presentation to the House Committee on Natural Resources and Energy and the Senate Natural Resources Committee

AP 1000 Press Conference – Technical Statement

Mr. Gundersen's technical statement for the press conference on post accident AP1000 containment leakage regarding containment integrity.
Link to Press Statement by Groups contracting for the analysis - http://www.nirs.org/press/04-21-2010/1.

AP1000 Containment Leakage Report Fairewinds Associates - Gundersen, Hausler, 4-21-2010.pdf

  • There have been more than 80-identified problems with containment systems over the last 45 years.
  • Several containment liners have developed through-wall rust holes.
  • The AP1000 design is unique, with only one containment barrier.
  • The AP1000 design is more susceptible to rust than existing designs.
  • The AP1000 Chimney effect will cause any radiation leakage to be released directly into the environment.
  • The AP1000 has the likelihood of releasing higher levels of radiation after an accident than existing reactor designs.

    *This revision corrects the typographical error on page 16, see footnote 19 or end note.

Fairewinds Associates, Inc Second Quarterly Report VY Oversight 2-22-2010

  • Progress graph on the 81 items Entergy must implement
  • Review of the Enexus Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
  • Chronology of Underground Pipe Testimony
  • Tritium contamination map and buried pipe and underground tank discussion
  • General Design Criteria regarding liquid effluent releases
  • Public Service Board Comments by Chairman James Volz regarding Entergy's misrepresentation of the issue of buried underground pipes

Beaver Valley Unit 1 Gundersen Testimony to the NRC May 2009

As an expert witness retained by Citizen Power, this testimony highlights significant safety problems with Beaver Valley Unit 1's Containment.

During a refueling outage in April 2009, Beaver Valley discovered a through wall breach in its containment liner. Testimony showed that:

  • Beaver Valley's Visual and Ultrasonic Inspections had failed to detect any progress as the hole developed until it completely breached the liner.
  • The unique sub-atmospheric containment design may have contributed to the breach.
  • A complete ultrasonic inspection of the entire containment should be required.
  • The 20-year license renewal should be delayed until the root cause of the problem is resolved.

Bellefonte Units 1 and 2 (TVA) Gundersen Testimony to the NRC, May 2009 on behalf of Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League

After terminating its Construction Permit (CP) in 2005, and not having any NRC facility oversight for almost three years, Bellefonte asked to have its CP reinstated late in 2008. Arnie testified that:

  • There is no basis in law for the reinstatement of the CP
  • Cannibalization of the plant had begun, meaning that major equipment, pipes, etc were removed from the plant and the plant was left open to further natural deterioration. This cannibalization clearly violates 10 CFR 50’s General Design Criteria and Appendix B Quality Assurance requirements.
  • Seismic and Hydrologic conditions have changed significantly since the plant was first designed in the 1970's and therefore require further critical analysis.

Vermont Yankee Oversight Panel report to the Vermont Legislature, March 2009

Four nuclear experts were appointed by Vermont’s legislature and Governor to assess whether Vermont Yankee should be allowed to continue to operate after its 40 year license expires in 2012. The report found serious problems including:

  • Aging equipment, including the condenser and main steam isolation valves
  • Aging workforce with inadequate procedures for continued long-term plant operation with new personnel
  • Serious equipment failures could have been avoided but management did not apply adequate money and time for inspections based on employee concerns.
  • Equipment reliability was in the worst 25% of all plants nationwide
  • Weak corrective action program

Millstone 3 Containment Gundersen Testimony to NRC 8-26-08, New Information Contention

  • Comparison of the relative size of PWR Containment buildings
  • Comparison of the criteria between extended and stretch power uprates
  • Discussion of the construction issues associated with sub-atmospheric containments